Yes, I was thinking about storing encrypted keys, but still, using claims is clearly just wrong... Using a vault to store the key is probably the way to go, even though it adds another service the setup depends on.
Yes, I was thinking about storing encrypted keys, but still, using claims is clearly just wrong... Using a vault to store the key is probably the way to go, even though it adds another service the setup depends on.
A fall-back to the current way of unlocking the volume would probably be a good idea. It wouldn't be fun to lose access to something because a cloud service went down or access to it was lost etc.
Definitely! I have bmc/kvm everywhere (well, everywhere that matters).
I have talked myself out of this (for now), though. I think if I ever find the time to revisit this, I will try to to it by injecting some oidc-based approval (memo to myself: ciba flow?) into something like clevis/tang.
thanks for using Leebra!
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Ironically, the passphrase for the encryption wouldn't be encrypted in this scenario as claims can be decoded from the token payload if intercepted. It would also probably be stored as-is server side as well. Claims aren't designed as secrets.
Perhaps you could authorise a request to an actual secrets manager via oidc though, allowing the volume to be unlocked.
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