cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/9679003

When a Facebook group dedicated to selling second-hand clothes or home fragrances suddenly starts posting about government scandals and geopolitical conspiracies, most users scroll past without a second thought. That, according to analyst Alfredas Chmieliauskas, is precisely the point.

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Chmieliauskas is co-founder of Repsense, a Lithuanian company that has been mapping how pro-Russian narratives spread across social media in EU member states. Its findings, based on monitoring activity in Lithuania, reveal a coordinated and sophisticated operation that reaches millions of people, often without them realising they are consuming propaganda.

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Repsense's research ... has identified near-identical playbooks operating in Armenia, Hungary, Germany and elsewhere – all tracing back to the same source.

"In Russia, topics are first broadcast through so-called influencers and media networks ... They are then adapted for foreign audiences through local outlets.

It's similar to information money-laundering: messages are tailored to local audiences. This is done by local influencers, some of whom are politicians. The line between politician and influencer is increasingly blurred."

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The common themes are strikingly consistent across countries: attacks on the government and democratic institutions; "traditional family values" framed against supposedly decadent Western ones; and narratives around the war in Ukraine designed to discourage support for Kyiv.

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"Hate speech is one of the tools – it works on certain demographics. There are at least five archetypes used to attack the situation around the Kapčiamiestis training ground, for instance.

One is distortion: the claim that Poland supposedly opposes the facility. Another is a seemingly rational argument: Lithuania already has nine training grounds, do we need another one? Then there are conspiracy theories, that preparations are being made for war with Kaliningrad. Another distortion frames it as anti-NATO: that this is not defence but force deployment. And another portrays it as a suicide mission for Lithuania, playing on fear."

The aim, says Chmieliauskas, is to attack from every possible angle and see what sticks. Hate speech is one of those angles. Repsense finds that the highest number of mentions in a hate context target Jewish people, particularly now with the heightened situation in the Middle East, a narrative that exists worldwide.

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On TikTok, Repsense identified influencers with large, apolitical followings – makeup tutorial creators, lifestyle accounts – who suddenly began posting political content aligned with pro-Russian narratives.

On Facebook, the company found commercial pages with names such as Home Fragrances and Second-hand Clothes that appeared to sell everyday goods but were interspersed with a steady stream of scandal stories and attacks on public figures.

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Chmieliauskas is sceptical about blanket bans, despite pressure in some European countries, notably Germany, to restrict certain groups and crack down on political propaganda online.

"I think the most effective approach is to respond to the messages being spread by propagandists and simply put better narratives out there."

For law enforcement, he argues that mapping how messages spread can help build a picture of financial connections between individuals, the** ultimate goal being to follow the money and establish who is paying whom**.

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