The Monero Research Lab (MRL) has decided to recommend that all Monero node operators enable a ban list
- Download the ban list and:
./monerod --ban-list
shortwavesurfer 4 points 2 years ago
Just added this to my node and posted the url to my nostr followers
Eriq 1 point 2 years ago
All the subnet addresses are not banned and shows error when adding any subnet, other IPs without the subnet format are added successfully : "
2024-12-08 22:08:06.735 E Invalid IP address or IPv4 subnet: 91.198.115.0/24
2024-12-08 22:08:06.735 E Invalid IP address or IPv4 subnet: 100.42.27.0/24
2024-12-08 22:08:06.735 E Invalid IP address or IPv4 subnet: 162.218.65.0/24
2024-12-08 22:08:06.735 E Invalid IP address or IPv4 subnet: 193.142.4.0/24
2024-12-08 22:08:06.735 E Invalid IP address or IPv4 subnet: 199.116.84.0/24
2024-12-08 22:08:06.735 E Invalid IP address or IPv4 subnet: 209.222.252.0/24 "
These IPs account for more than half the problem and do not seem to be banned properly by the ban list.
If the subnet format does not work we could enumerate the subnet and have each individual IP from that subnet on the list as a workaround.
Eriq 1 point 2 years ago
https://github.com/... seems to fix the issue above for me.
All I modified was the subnets, expanding them into individual IPs to be banned properly.
Wave 1 point 2 years ago
Node operators who use this list should subscribe to Boog900/monero-ban-list updates so that a new version can be added when changes are made to the list.
shortwavesurfer 2 points 2 years ago
Looks like it might be something on your end because I just tried one of the IPs that yours gave an invalid for and it works fine.
Eriq 1 point 2 years ago
Did you manually ban from the monerod terminal? subnet parsing works when manually banning it from cli but seems to have issues when loading automatically ban list. If u loaded it with the ban list and it worked then it is somehow a local issue for me.
Eriq 4 points 2 years ago
It removes the spy nodes from network so they cant do a timing attack (If one spy node receives a transaction unseen by the 100s of other spy nodes, they can logically deduce that the first instance seen was the originator of the transaction/block). The current list above has a parsing error for the subnets (IPs with 0/24) and those are important because each single subnet contains 256 possible IPs. These possible IPs are fully actively being utilized for the attack as I have seen first hand. I hope Boog900 or one of the list maintainers can address this parsing error somehow so I can remove my temporary fixed list. This could be somehow a personal error somehow but most probably these unparsed subnets are a unnoticed issue.
mister_monster 1 point 2 years ago
But with dandelion++ it should be infeasible to deduce anything about a transaction on receipt, no?
Eriq 2 points 2 years ago
Best solution when connecting to public nodes would be through Tor. Even if the public node is a spy node somehow with tor enabled, they would still be able to see requested blocks but would not be able to pinpoint who is requesting. It still adds a good layer and is recommended by most, but it is not perfect because Tor is also somewhat under a timing attack.
Eriq 2 points 2 years ago
yes the overall transaction is safe but the individual node sending that transaction/block is recorded with the IP logged. Mass collection with a large spy network would easily enable a semi reliable initiator logging system that could be used later for any purpose. You could connect to a public node to hide and not send from personal node but then again the public node itself could be a spy node too. Its all about collecting general metadata for use with other data to be cross examined when the time is needed.
mister_monster 2 points 2 years ago
Well, the concept of a ban list seems ripe for abuse. We have to trust someone to tell us canonically who the bad nodes are, people can slap a fed honeypot node label on you for not going along with something.
What we need to do is design the system such that a bad node can do nothing but participate in the network. Just like the mining incentive structure with nakamoto consensus. Dandelion++ is supposed to do that, at least for everyone broadcasting their transactions only to initial nodes they know and trust. I don't know how to do that, but a blacklist is a dangerous stopgap.
Wave 1 point 2 years ago
explain the need of a ban list? And how it works?
Adding the ban-list to your Monero GUI wallet or your Monero node prevents connections from being made to other nodes that are suspected of harming the Monero network. You don't have to add a ban list, it's voluntary, just an official recommendation. But everyone who adds a ban-list contributes to the security of Monero.
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monero
@monero.town
235
945
5
This is the lemmy community of Monero (XMR), a secure, private, untraceable currency that is open-source and freely available to all.
Wallets
Android (Cake Wallet) / (Monero.com)
iOS (Cake Wallet) / (Monero.com)
Instance tags for discoverability:
Monero, XMR, crypto, cryptocurrency
go to feed...
Monero GUI wallet
If your run your own local node through the GUI wallet, go to Settings. In the "Daemon startup flags" box, input "--ban-list ". Then click the orange "Stop daemon" button. It will take a few seconds for the daemon to shut down. Then click the orange "Start daemon" button. If you use a remote node, whoever operates the remote node will decide if the ban list is enabled.
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